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Joshua Cranmer: Breaking news

Thunderbird - wo, 01/04/2015 - 09:00
It was brought to my attention recently by reputable sources that the recent announcement of increased usage in recent years produced an internal firestorm within Mozilla. Key figures raised alarm that some of the tech press had interpreted the blog post as a sign that Thunderbird was not, in fact, dead. As a result, they asked Thunderbird community members to make corrections to emphasize that Mozilla was trying to kill Thunderbird.

The primary fear, it seems, is that knowledge that the largest open-source email client was still receiving regular updates would impel its userbase to agitate for increased funding and maintenance of the client to help forestall potential threats to the open nature of email as well as to innovate in the space of providing usable and private communication channels. Such funding, however, would be an unaffordable luxury and would only distract Mozilla from its central goal of building developer productivity tooling. Persistent rumors that Mozilla would be willing to fund Thunderbird were it renamed Firefox Email were finally addressed with the comment, "such a renaming would violate our current policy that all projects be named Persona."

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

Calendar: We are now on Twitter

Thunderbird - di, 03/03/2015 - 01:39

In the spirit of Twitter I will keep this blog post down to 140 characters. Check out @mozcalendar for more frequent updates on the project.

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

Thunderbird Blog: Thunderbird Usage Continues to Grow

Thunderbird - vr, 27/02/2015 - 23:44

We’re happy to report that Thunderbird usage continues to expand.

Mozilla measures program usage by Active Daily Installations (ADI), which is the number of pings that Mozilla servers receive as installations do their daily plugin block-list update. This is not the same as the number of active users, since some users don’t access their program each day, and some installations are behind firewalls. An estimate of active monthly users is typically done by multiplying the ADI by a factor of 3.

To plot changes in Thunderbird usage over time, I’ve picked the peak ADI for each month for the last few years. Here’s the result:

Thunderbird Active Daily Installations, peak value per month.

Germany has long been our #1 country for usage, but in 4th quarter 2014, Japan exceeded US as the #2 country. Here’s the top 10 countries, taken from the ADI count of February 24, 2015:

Rank Country ADI 2015-02-24 1 Germany 1,711,834 2 Japan 1,002,877 3 United States 927,477 4 France 777,478 5 Italy 514,771 6 Russian Federation 494,645 7 Poland 480,496 8 Spain 282,008 9 Brazil 265,820 10 United Kingdom 254,381 All Others 2,543,493 Total 9,255,280

Country Rankings for Thunderbird Usage, February 24, 2015

The Thunderbird team is now working hard preparing our next major release, which will be Thunderbird 38 in May 2015. We’ll be blogging more about that release in the next few weeks, including reporting on the many new features that we have added.

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

Bryan Clark: hacked by NG689Skw

Thunderbird - di, 10/02/2015 - 08:07

hacked by NG689Skw

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

Mark Banner: Firefox Hello Desktop: Behind the Scenes – Flux and React

Thunderbird - ma, 09/02/2015 - 21:49

This is the first of a few posts that I’m planning regarding discussion about how we implement and work on the desktop and standalone parts of Firefox Hello. We’ve been doing some things in different ways, which we have found to be advantageous. We know other teams are interested in what we do, so its time to share!

Content Processes

First, a little bit of architecture: The panels and conversation window run in content processes (just like regular web pages). The conversation window shares code with the link-clicker pages that are on hello.firefox.com.

Hence those parts run very much in a web-style, and for various reasons, we decided to create them in a web-style manner. As a result, we’ve ended up with using React and Flux to aid our development.

I’ll detail more about the architecture in future posts.

The Flux Pattern

Flux is a recommended pattern for use alongside React, although I think you could use it with other frameworks as well. I’ll detail here about how we use Flux specifically for Hello. As Flux is a pattern, there’s no one set standard and the methods of implementation vary.

Flux Overview

The main parts of a flux system are stores, components and actions. Some of this is a bit like an MVC system, but I find there’s better definition about what does what.
Diagram of Example flow in a Flux patternAn action is effectively a result of an event, that changes the system. For example, in Loop, we use actions for user events, but we also use them for any data incoming from the server.

A store contains the business logic. It listens to actions, when it receives one, it does something based on the action and updates its state appropriately.

A component is a view. The view has a set of properties (passed in values) and/or state (the state is obtained from the store’s state). For a given set of properties and state, you always get the same layout. The components listen for updates to the state in the stores and update appropriately.

We also have a dispatcher. The dispatcher dispatches actions to interested stores. Only one action can be processed at any one time. If a new action comes in, then the dispatcher queues it.

Actions are always synchronous – if changes would happen due to external stimuli then these will be new actions. For example, this prevents actions from blocking other actions whilst waiting for a response from the server.

What advantages do we get?

For Hello, we find the flux pattern fits very nicely. Before, we used a traditional MVC model, however, we kept on getting in a mess with events being all over the place, and application logic being wrapped in amongst the views as well as the models.

Now, we have a much more defined structure:

  • Components/views are a place for displaying, there’s some logic about what to display, but it isn’t business logic.
  • The business logic exists in the stores, and is triggered by actions.
  • You can follow an action through and find out which stores listen for it, and what they do.
  • Actions themselves are well-defined with specified parameters.

React provides the component structure, it has defined ways of tracking state and properties, and the re-rendering on state change gives much automation. Since it encourages the separation of immutable properties, a whole class of inadvertent errors is eliminated.

There’s also many advantages with debugging – we have a flag that lets us watch all the actions going through the system, so its much easier to track what events are taking place and the data passed with them. This combined with the fact that actions have limited scope, helps with debugging the data flows.

Simple Unit Testing

For testing, we’re able to do unit testing in a much simpler fashion:

  • Components/Views are tested by setting up their state and/or properties and ensuring the correct elements are displayed:
it("should render a muted local audio button", function() { var comp = TestUtils.renderIntoDocument( React.createElement(sharedViews.MediaControlButton, { scope: "local", type: "audio", action: function(){}, enabled: false })); expect(comp.getDOMNode().classList.contains("muted")).eql(true); });
  • Stores are tested by setting an initial state, sending an action, and checking the resultant state:
it("should set the state to READY", function() { store.setupRoomInfo(new sharedActions.SetupRoomInfo(fakeRoomInfo)); expect(store._storeState.roomState).eql(ROOM_STATES.READY); });

We therefore have many tests written at the unit test level. Many times we’ve found and prevented issues whilst writing these tests, and yet, because these are all content based, we can run the tests in a few seconds. I’ll go more into testing in a future post.

References

Here’s a few references to some of the areas in our code base that are good example of our flux implementation. Note that behind the scenes, everything is known as Loop – the codename for the project.

Conclusion and more coming…

We’ve found using the flux model is much more organised than we were with an MVC, possibly its just a better defined methodology, but it gave us the structure we badly missing. In future posts, I’ll discuss about our development facilities, more about the desktop architecture and whatever else comes up, so please do leave questions in the comments and I’ll try and answer them either direct or with more posts.

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

Joshua Cranmer: Why email is hard, part 8: why email security failed

Thunderbird - di, 13/01/2015 - 05:38
This post is part 8 of an intermittent series exploring the difficulties of writing an email client. Part 1 describes a brief history of the infrastructure. Part 2 discusses internationalization. Part 3 discusses MIME. Part 4 discusses email addresses. Part 5 discusses the more general problem of email headers. Part 6 discusses how email security works in practice. Part 7 discusses the problem of trust. This part discusses why email security has largely failed.

At the end of the last part in this series, I posed the question, "Which email security protocol is most popular?" The answer to the question is actually neither S/MIME nor PGP, but a third protocol, DKIM. I haven't brought up DKIM until now because DKIM doesn't try to secure email in the same vein as S/MIME or PGP, but I still consider it relevant to discussing email security.

Unquestionably, DKIM is the only security protocol for email that can be considered successful. There are perhaps 4 billion active email addresses [1]. Of these, about 1-2 billion use DKIM. In contrast, S/MIME can count a few million users, and PGP at best a few hundred thousand. No other security protocols have really caught on past these three. Why did DKIM succeed where the others fail?

DKIM's success stems from its relatively narrow focus. It is nothing more than a cryptographic signature of the message body and a smattering of headers, and is itself stuck in the DKIM-Signature header. It is meant to be applied to messages only on outgoing servers and read and processed at the recipient mail server—it completely bypasses clients. That it bypasses clients allows it to solve the problem of key discovery and key management very easily (public keys are stored in DNS, which is already a key part of mail delivery), and its role in spam filtering is strong motivation to get it implemented quickly (it is 7 years old as of this writing). It's also simple: this one paragraph description is basically all you need to know [2].

The failure of S/MIME and PGP to see large deployment is certainly a large topic of discussion on myriads of cryptography enthusiast mailing lists, which often like to partake in propositions of new end-to-end encryption of email paradigms, such as the recent DIME proposal. Quite frankly, all of these solutions suffer broadly from at least the same 5 fundamental weaknesses, and I see it unlikely that a protocol will come about that can fix these weaknesses well enough to become successful.

The first weakness, and one I've harped about many times already, is UI. Most email security UI is abysmal and generally at best usable only by enthusiasts. At least some of this is endemic to security: while it mean seem obvious how to convey what an email signature or an encrypted email signifies, how do you convey the distinctions between sign-and-encrypt, encrypt-and-sign, or an S/MIME triple wrap? The Web of Trust model used by PGP (and many other proposals) is even worse, in that inherently requires users to do other actions out-of-band of email to work properly.

Trust is the second weakness. Consider that, for all intents and purposes, the email address is the unique identifier on the Internet. By extension, that implies that a lot of services are ultimately predicated on the notion that the ability to receive and respond to an email is a sufficient means to identify an individual. However, the entire purpose of secure email, or at least of end-to-end encryption, is subtly based on the fact that other people in fact have access to your mailbox, thus destroying the most natural ways to build trust models on the Internet. The quest for anonymity or privacy also renders untenable many other plausible ways to establish trust (e.g., phone verification or government-issued ID cards).

Key discovery is another weakness, although it's arguably the easiest one to solve. If you try to keep discovery independent of trust, the problem of key discovery is merely picking a protocol to publish and another one to find keys. Some of these already exist: PGP key servers, for example, or using DANE to publish S/MIME or PGP keys.

Key management, on the other hand, is a more troubling weakness. S/MIME, for example, basically works without issue if you have a certificate, but managing to get an S/MIME certificate is a daunting task (necessitated, in part, by its trust model—see how these issues all intertwine?). This is also where it's easy to say that webmail is an unsolvable problem, but on further reflection, I'm not sure I agree with that statement anymore. One solution is just storing the private key with the webmail provider (you're trusting them as an email client, after all), but it's also not impossible to imagine using phones or flash drives as keystores. Other key management factors are more difficult to solve: people who lose their private keys or key rollover create thorny issues. There is also the difficulty of managing user expectations: if I forget my password to most sites (even my email provider), I can usually get it reset somehow, but when a private key is lost, the user is totally and completely out of luck.

Of course, there is one glaring and almost completely insurmountable problem. Encrypted email fundamentally precludes certain features that we have come to take for granted. The lesser known is server-side search and filtration. While there exist some mechanisms to do search on encrypted text, those mechanisms rely on the fact that you can manipulate the text to change the message, destroying the integrity feature of secure email. They also tend to be fairly expensive. It's easy to just say "who needs server-side stuff?", but the contingent of people who do email on smartphones would not be happy to have to pay the transfer rates to download all the messages in their folder just to find one little email, nor the energy costs of doing it on the phone. And those who have really large folders—Fastmail has a design point of 1,000,000 in a single folder—would still prefer to not have to transfer all their mail even on desktops.

The more well-known feature that would disappear is spam filtration. Consider that 90% of all email is spam, and if you think your spam folder is too slim for that to be true, it's because your spam folder only contains messages that your email provider wasn't sure were spam. The loss of server-side spam filtering would dramatically increase the cost of spam (a 10% reduction in efficiency would double the amount of server storage, per my calculations), and client-side spam filtering is quite literally too slow [3] and too costly (remember smartphones? Imagine having your email take 10 times as much energy and bandwidth) to be a tenable option. And privacy or anonymity tends to be an invitation to abuse (cf. Tor and Wikipedia). Proposed solutions to the spam problem are so common that there is a checklist containing most of the objections.

When you consider all of those weaknesses, it is easy to be pessimistic about the possibility of wide deployment of powerful email security solutions. The strongest future—all email is encrypted, including metadata—is probably impossible or at least woefully impractical. That said, if you weaken some of the assumptions (say, don't desire all or most traffic to be encrypted), then solutions seem possible if difficult.

This concludes my discussion of email security, at least until things change for the better. I don't have a topic for the next part in this series picked out (this part actually concludes the set I knew I wanted to discuss when I started), although OAuth and DMARC are two topics that have been bugging me enough recently to consider writing about. They also have the unfortunate side effect of being things likely to see changes in the near future, unlike most of the topics I've discussed so far. But rest assured that I will find more difficulties in the email infrastructure to write about before long!

[1] All of these numbers are crude estimates and are accurate to only an order of magnitude. To justify my choices: I assume 1 email address per Internet user (this overestimates the developing world and underestimates the developed world). The largest webmail providers have given numbers that claim to be 1 billion active accounts between them, and all of them use DKIM. S/MIME is guessed by assuming that any smartcard deployment supports S/MIME, and noting that the US Department of Defense and Estonia's digital ID project are both heavy users of such smartcards. PGP is estimated from the size of the strong set and old numbers on the reachable set from the core Web of Trust.
[2] Ever since last April, it's become impossible to mention DKIM without referring to DMARC, as a result of Yahoo's controversial DMARC policy. A proper discussion of DMARC (and why what Yahoo did was controversial) requires explaining the mail transmission architecture and spam, however, so I'll defer that to a later post. It's also possible that changes in this space could happen within the next year.
[3] According to a former GMail spam employee, if it takes you as long as three minutes to calculate reputation, the spammer wins.

Categorieën: Mozilla-nl planet

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